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Abstract 
The determinacy question, concerning whether or not there is convergence to a unique equilibrium path, in an explicitly 
dynamic setting, has been addressed in closed economies but only scantily in an open one. We undertake this task, using 
a model that leads to a 4th -degree characteristic equation which cannot be handled analytically; therefore, we develop a 
particular algorithm to solve it. We show that the determinacy-consistent specification of Taylor‟s rule depends, 
critically, on the greater or lower openness in the trade sector. Greater openness supports a novel specification of 
Taylor‟s rule with stronger emphasis on output gaps and weaker emphasis on the price stability than in earlier studies. 
Under this rule, determinate equilibrium dynamics is shown to be possible. When trade openness decreases significantly, 
determinacy is still possible, but it is compatible with a far more conventional formulation Taylor‟s rule where price 
stability has absolute priority.  
Keywords: Taylor‟s rule, trade openness, determinacy, Taylor‟s principle  
JEL Classification: C54, E52 
1. Short Introductory Remarks 
A crucial theme in macroeconomic dynamics concerns the issue of determinacy, that is, the   question of uniqueness 
or multiplicity of admissible dynamic trajectories. Relevant topical studies have addressed this question in the setting of 
closed economies. We purport to examine the question of determinacy and how it is affected by Taylor‟s rule, in the 
face of varying degrees of trade openness in an economy exhibiting openness in all of its sectors. 
The nature of Taylor‟s work was primarily empirical rather than normative, spawned a large multi-faceted body of 
literature (see for example, Koenig et al, 2012) and has had profound implications about how monetary policy should be 
conducted. A remarkable feature of his (1993) celebrated work is that injudiciously designed rules may cause instability 
and multiple equilibria (indeterminacy/non-uniqueness). For example, in case of an inflationary increase in aggregate 
demand, the federal funds rate should respond sufficiently enough to enable real interest rates to rise unequivocally, to 
stifle the incipient inflationary pressure (commonly known as Taylor‟s principle); otherwise the entire process may 
evolve in a self-perpetuated way and lead to instability that is a major issue in macroeconomic dynamics. Hence, 
Taylor‟s principle and macroeconomic stability/uniqueness (determinacy) were from the beginning, closely intertwined. 
Although, Taylor‟s principle has been considered an important guidepost, especially, for monetary policy making, 
historic periods have existed in which its validity has been questioned, as we shall see in a subsequent discussion. 
2. Review of Antecedent Literature  
The literature on the question of determinacy has increased over the years. An early study was conducted by Clarida et 
al (2000) who noted the transition from indeterminacy to determinacy since the early eighties (the Volcker-Greenspan 
era), from the toughening of the anti-inflationary stance that took place. Hirose et al (2017),  in  revisiting the  Great 
Inflation of the 1970‟s, conclude, however, that the switch to an anti-inflationary stance was not by itself sufficient to 
bring inflation down and achieve transition to determinacy, but a number of other factors contributed as well. 
Other major studies, in this line of inquiry are Bullard and Mitra (2002), Kiley (2007), Ascari and Ropele (2009), 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), Giannoni(2014), Gerko and Sossounov(2015), Arias et al (2017). The former 
derives analytical conditions for determinacy when expectations are viewed as a learning process, and is still considered 
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as a major reference work in this area. Their stability condition derived under a contemporaneous data policy rule 
(besides forward-looking and back-ward looking rules) has been called the generalized Taylor‟s principle (Woodford 
(2003, ch.4; Ascari and Ropele,2009) and pertains to the long run. In Bullard and Mitra (2007) it is shown that the 
presence or not of inertia in the policy rule matters critically for the issue of determinacy; its presence promotes 
equilibrium determinacy. Accordingly, it has emerged as an important factor for the matter at hand, as attested by the 
studies examined in the following discussion. 
Subsequent studies sought to re-examine Taylor‟s principle regarding determinacy, from a variety of perspectives where 
the inflation rate features prominently and, in particular, exhibits trend in its behavior. In their analysis of a New 
Keynesian model with capital accumulation and possible price indexation, Ascari and Ropele (2009) showed that trend 
inflation expands the indeterminacy region in the parameter space. Taylor‟s principle breaks down and the generalized 
principle emerges necessary but not sufficient to generate determinacy. For a certain level of trend inflation in the zero 
indexation case, response to output gaps is not inimical to determinacy. They also find that an interest rate rule with 
inertia renders the Taylor principle simply of minor importance and it is the output gap response that is of actual 
relevance. Furthermore, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (op.cit.), in their empirical investigation of the Great Moderation 
era, sought to critically re-examine the determinacy question and noted that determinacy may exist without necessarily 
Taylor‟s principle be satisfied; the switch to determinacy after the Volcker disinflation occurred also because of the 
decline of trend inflation and the change in the Fed‟s general policy stance. The model of Gerko and Sossounov(2015) 
combines trend inflation with capital accumulation; they find that indeterminacy exists if the target rate of inflation 
exceeds two percent. Notably, they find support for a monetary rule that reacts to output fluctuations but to a measured 
extent.  More recently, Arias et al (2017), examine the period of Great Moderation, in a New Keynesian model with 
capital accumulation, and conclude that determinacy exists when the target rate of inflation is in the range of two to four 
percent conditional on the monetary rule being estimated from their model.  
Ambler and Lam (2015), compared inflation targeting (IT) with price level targeting (PLT), and concluded that for the 
parameter space examined, indeterminacy does not arise under PLT (contrary to the case of IT). Earlier, in a broadly 
similar vein, Dittmar and Gavin (2005), in a RBC model with money and capital accumulation, had shown that 
determinacy obtains when the policy coefficient on the price level belongs to the interval (0, 2) with a zero policy 
coefficient on inflation. Interestingly enough, Coibion and Gorodnichenko(op.cit) showed that pursuing strict PLT is 
equivalent to following a highly inertial interest rate rule that ensures determinacy either for zero or  for positive trend 
inflation. In a parallel spirit, Giannoni(2014) in a  purely New Keynesian closed economy model shows that rule with 
a PLT component implies inertia and determinate equilibrium, when  
         y                                            y                          Though not addressing the 
determinacy issue, worthy of mention, is the study by Dib et al (2013) in that they show that PLT relative to CPI 
inflation targeting, reduces welfare costs by alleviating the costs of financial shocks and frictions associated with 
uncertainty surrounding nominal debt contracts in a New Keynesian model of Canada. 
 Crucial exceptions to the above body of works, are the studies of De Fiore and Liu (2005), Lliosa and Tuesta(2008). 
The former derives rigorous conditions that the parameters concerning the degree of trade openness and strict inflation 
rules (passive or active) must satisfy, in order for equilibrium determinacy to exist. The economy envisaged in their 
work is primarily one of pure exchange. When this assumption is relaxed, labor is the sole factor input entering the 
production process. In the present work, however, the possibility of an imported factor input is not ruled out, which is 
more appropriate for the case of a small open economy that is our main focus. Lliosa and Tuesta (op. cit.) show how the 
Bullard-Mitra determinacy and learnability conditions are modified in the case of a small open economy; like the 
previous study, they abstract from the presence of a foreign input and although they consider various rules, the one with 
a PLT component is not among them. 
Here, we concentrate on probing the determinacy properties of Taylor‟s rule that affords, through a particular approach, 
clear insight regarding the role trade openness. For the reason mentioned below, less emphasis shall be given on the 
formal analytical stability conditions and more on the calibrated data analysis based on plausible examples of 
economies. In contrast to earlier simpler models, the one used in this study is an extended three-equation framework in 
which the LaSalle stability conditions turn out practically inapplicable. This necessitates the use of a numerical 
approach which, from methodology point of view, shall prove particularly illuminating for an issue that has been only 
scantily researched and there is scope for further probing. Furthermore, in the light of earlier findings, instead of 
inflation targeting we choose to focus on a Taylor monetary rule, specified in terms of stabilizing price level deviations 
and output gaps.  
The main finding of this paper may be stated as follows. Convergence to a unique equilibrium is shown to be attainable 
in open economies of different size, conditional on the proper specification of the policy rule. Further, it is shown 
through numerical analysis of alternative cases that the design of determinacy-consistent Taylor‟s rule is critically 
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linked to the degree of trade openness. In particular for a higher degree of trade openness, the role of output gaps gains 
in significance with the price level acquiring only a slim priority in significance. For a lower degree of trade openness, 
however, far more conventional results of prior studies are replicated, in which price stability takes absolute precedence. 
The importance of the degree of trade openness is sufficiently illustrated for the issue determinacy and how Taylor rules 
should be designed. 
 In the light of earlier findings, when the policy rule has a PLT component, as in our case, Taylor‟s principle is reduced 
to a state of irrelevance. Moreover, the integration of an exchange rate channel in the supply sector has mainly 
quantitative rather than qualitative effects. Finally, the question of the optimal monetary policy in an open economy is 
briefly addressed. 
The structural blocks of the model, its final matrix form, technical issues involved and the annotated results are 
discussed in the following sections. 
3. The Model 
3.1 The Aggregate Demand Sector 
Our general findings are derived through a model which is an „amalgam‟ of diverse elements combined in an eclectic 
manner. It is eclectic because while the households sector is assumed to make consumption decisions according to the 
New Keynesian paradigm,  the wage-price sector functions in a way that diverges from this paradigm. 
The following open economy output equation together with its structural foundation elements, serve our purposes well 
as an analytical vehicle. They are following the basic structure of Clarida et al (2001), Gali (2008, ch. 7),Lim and 
McNelis (2008, ch.2) and, especially, Guender (2011), that is common in this type of models:   
𝑌𝑡 = −𝛷1 ,𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 *𝜃𝑃𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜃)(Et+1 + 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 ) − (𝜃𝑃𝑡 + (1 − 𝜃)(Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓))+- + 𝛷2[Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(Et+1 +
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡+1)] + 𝛷3(𝑌𝑡
𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1
𝑓 ) + 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1 + 𝜔𝑡                                        (3.1.1)  
where: 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝛱𝑡= (𝜃𝑃𝑡 + (1 − 𝜃)(Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓)) is the domestic Consumer Price Index   
(1 − 𝜃) = a measure of the degree of trade openness as in earlier studies 
𝑌𝑡 = output  𝑃𝑡 = 𝑑omestic price level, 𝑟𝑡 =nominal interest rate, E 𝑡=domestic currency units per unit of foreign 
currency, 𝑃𝑡
𝑓
= foreign goods price index, 𝑌𝑡
𝑓
= foreign output;  Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡 =           x           ; 
𝜔𝑡                     k       b   by   w                  . 𝛷𝑖 i=1,2,3 are composite parameters. Expectations are 
supposed to be rational, and variables (except for interest rates) are typically in logarithms. The steady state rate of 
inflation is constant, that in full equilibrium could be taken as zero.   
The following text provides a basic description. Equation (3.1.1) describes the home output equation (which equals 
aggregate consumption,𝐶𝑡), in a small open dynamic economy. On the output side, output consists of home goods 
internally consumed (𝐶𝑡
𝑑 )  and home goods exported abroad (𝐶𝑡
𝑑𝑓) . The aggregate consumption ( 𝐶𝑡 ) is divided 
between home goods consumed by domestic households (𝐶𝑡
𝑑)  and imported consumption goods bought by domestic 
households (𝐶𝑡
𝑓).  
Optimal intra-period share of aggregate consumption spent on domestic goods is described by the following standard 
condition:  
                                  𝐶𝑡
𝑑 = ln(θ)−𝜂[(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡)] +  𝐶𝑡                                                     (3 1 2)  
Setting 𝜂 =1, substituting for CPI and re-arranging, the previous equation takes the form:  
                                  𝐶𝑡
𝑑 = (1 − 𝜃)(Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡)+ ln(θ)+ 𝐶𝑡                       (3.1.2b) 
Leading one period forward and taking expectations results in: 
                     𝐸𝑡𝐶𝑡+1
𝑑  = (1 − 𝜃)𝐸𝑡(E𝑡+1+𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡+1)+ln(θ)+𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑡+1]              (3.1.2c) 
Subtracting by sides, results in: 
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           𝐶𝑡
𝑑 − 𝐸𝑡𝐶𝑡+1
𝑑 =(1 − 𝜃)[(Et + 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡) − 𝐸𝑡(E𝑡+1+𝑃𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡+1)] + (𝐶𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑡+1] )           ( 3.1.2d)     
The aggregate consumption  𝐶𝑡  involves standard inter-temporal utility maximization of consumption over time 
(described in Appendix A.1), subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint involving aggregate consumption plus 
one-period real bonds (i.e. deflated by CPI=Π) along with their gross, risk-less interest returns as they change from one 
time period to the next. Lagrangian intertemporal optimization which takes prices as given and maximizes with respect 
to quantities (consumption and bonds), leads to the following well-known Euler condition for consumption: 
                𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐  𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑡(= −    ) +  𝐸𝑡[𝐶𝑡+1] −  (𝑟𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 𝑡+1
   ) +   𝑡           (3.1.3) 
where ρ                      substitution elasticity and  𝑡
    is CPI inflation rate at t.  
Substituting (3.1.3) into (3.1.2d) provides us the first structural foundation component. The second component begins 
with acknowledging that aggregate output, after log-linearization, consists of home consumption and domestic exports 
(relative to their means):  
                                          𝑌𝑡 −  ?̅?= (θ) (𝐶𝑡
𝑑−𝐶𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  )+(1−θ)(𝐶𝑡
𝑑𝑓−𝐶𝑑𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)                        (3.1.4) 
Leading one period ahead and taking expectations leads to: 
           ( 𝐸𝑡𝑌𝑡+1 − ?̅?)  = (𝜃)(𝐸𝑡𝐶𝑡+1
𝑑 −𝐶𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +(1−θ)( 𝐸𝑡𝐶𝑡+1
𝑑𝑓 − 𝐶𝑑𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (3.1.4a)    
Denoting with small-case letters the variables relative to their steady state and subtracting by sides, results in: 
                             𝑦𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1=(𝜃)(𝑐𝑡
𝑑  −𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑡+1
𝑑 ) +(1−𝜃)(𝑐𝑡
𝑑𝑓 − 𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑡+1
𝑑𝑓 )                  (3.1.5)  
Equation (3.1.5) may be said to lie at the core of the present frame and plays a key role in the construction of the 
derived output equation. Exports (relative to their forward expectation) are assumed to depend on the real exchange rate 
and foreign output(relative to their respective forward expectation). Using the exports equation as described above and 
equation (3.1.2d), both in deviatons form, plugging them into (3.1.5) and re-arranging, we obtain equation (3.1.1𝛼), 
after re-prameterizing,  that is the counterpart of (3.1.1) with the variables expressed as deviations relative to their 
means(including the nominal interest rate).  
Higher-ceteris paribus- interest rates affect not only aggregate demand but also the supply sector. Through the channel 
of intertemporal substitution (output squeezing) and through attracting foreign funds that cause depreciation in 
 E 𝑡   u              demand and expanding supply as it turns out. The net effect on 
𝑌𝑡      𝑃𝑡      k  y          calling for a policy- induced reduction in interest rates that sets off the equilibrating process. 
All these signify the importance of the trade sector‟s openness that features prominently throughout the analysis.  
3.2 The Home Pricing Sector 
The pricing scheme employed generally departs from earlier New Keynesian literature and in some respects, it 
envisages a different frame incorporating features that could be described as pragmatic. The starting point of our pricing 
scheme is, unlike earlier studies, the Rotemberg (1982) optimizing framework, in which monopolistically competitive 
firms face intratemporal and intertemporal costs of adjustment when changing their price. Recent macro-data examined 
by Richter and Throckmorton (2016), justifies the shift in favour of such a scheme; hence algebraically:  
 
   (𝐿𝑆) = 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝜉
𝑖∞
𝑖=0 [𝜅(𝑃𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑃𝑡+𝑖−1)
2 + 𝜇(𝑃𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑃𝑡+𝑖
∗ )2] 𝜅 𝜇 > 0                   (3.2.1) 
        𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑡
∗ + 𝛼3𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1                                    (3.2.2) 
                      𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 = 1, 𝛼3 = 𝜉𝛼1 where 𝜉 = discount factor=0.99          (3.2.3)   
 𝛼1 =
𝜅
𝜅 + 𝜇 + 𝜉𝜅
 𝛼2 =
𝜇
𝜅 + 𝜇 + 𝜉𝜅
 𝛼3 =
𝜉𝜅
𝜅 + 𝜇 + 𝜉𝜅
 
                                           
Equation (3.2.2) together with the set of relations (3.2.3), obtained after optimizing (3.2.1) with respect to 𝑃𝑡 and 
re-parameterising, describe a scheme comprising:  a) a predetermined price variable, b) a forward -looking price term 
and c) an  equilibrium price term, 𝑃𝑡
∗, that would have prevailed if there were price flexibility(with 𝜇 > 0 𝜅 = 0) .  
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Οur next task is to derive     x           𝑟 𝑃𝑡
∗  from a price flexible equilibrium frame and thus close essentially the 
pricing scheme. 𝑃𝑡
∗ is given in terms of a mark-up    *
∈
∈−1
+  (∈> 1                              y)   ugmented by 
the marginal cost, (𝑀𝐶)𝑡        :  
                                           𝑃𝑡
∗ =    *
∈
∈−1
+ + (𝑀𝐶)𝑡                                                      (3.2.4a)  
The (total) mark-up (   *
∈
∈−1
+)       u               of a constant   and a variable component   The variable 
component of firms mark-up is assumed to vary inversely with  u  u    u  u       (𝑌𝑡 − ?̅?); though evidence is not 
unanimous, the tentative consensus is that, in general, firms mark-ups tend to be countercyclical.  
 We further assume that the nominal wage rate (component of the marginal cost) is set according to a wage-setting 
scheme that takes into account institutionalized factors. Indexation schemes have been used in various Eurozone 
countries (ECB Monthly Bulletin, Prices and Costs, May, 2008); the cases of Belgium and Luxembourg are very 
characteristic examples. 
Because the labor market is highly differentiated and fragmented, we assume that it consists of two segments. 
Accordingly, the real wage is set according to two schemes: 
                             (𝑊𝑡)
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥= 𝜏1(𝑞1
𝑁)
𝑡
+ 𝛱𝑡          0< 𝜏1 ≤ 1              (3.2.4b) 
                           (𝑊𝑡)
𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 =  𝜏2(𝑞2𝑁 )𝑡 + 𝛱𝑡 +  𝜁1(𝑌𝑡 − ?̅?)    0< 𝜏2 < 1              (3.2.4c) 
                   𝑊𝑡 =  𝜓𝑊
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 + (1 − 𝜓)𝑊𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥                              (3.2.4d) 
   𝑞𝑖
𝑁 (𝑖 = 1 2) is labour productivity in each segment assumed to be pro-cyclical despite recent shifts in its 
behavioral pattern; 𝜏1      close to unity (or may equal it) while 𝜏2 is below unity. 
The first segment is characterized by real wage rigidity (especially downwards) that is well documented particularly in 
cases dominated by powerful trade unions that are disinclined to accept real wage cuts.  The presence of collective 
bargaining and employment protection legislation are further contributing factors. These are relevant to the scheme 
(3.2.4b). In the other segment, the labor force contains newly hired workers who are non-union members and includes 
less skilled workers who prefer greater employment stability, trading it off with greater real wage flexibility; thus, 
scheme (3.2.4c) becomes relevant. The term (𝑌𝑡 − ?̅?)      x       conditions in the labor market and the economy 
in general. In this case, there is no collective bargaining but rather individual firm-worker agreements. Note that unlike 
the former, the latter scheme effectively implies less than full indexation if 𝑌𝑡 < ?̅?. Bauer et al (2007), in their analysis, 
conclude that real wage rigidity remains important though its importance is declining over time.  
Next, we turn to the total cost equation consisting of labor cost and the foreign input cost.  Both inputs enter a 
Cobb-Douglas production function: 
        𝑌𝑡 =   𝛩0 + 𝛿1 𝛮𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑍𝑡                            (3.2.5) 
where:𝑁𝑡 =labour input and 𝑍𝑡 =foreign input imported from abroad; 𝛩0 = 1              y  
Marginal cost obtains from total cost and after performing log-linearization, it has the following form: 
(𝑀𝐶)𝑡 = 𝑧0 + 𝑧1[𝑊𝑡+𝑁𝑡−𝑌𝑡 −ln(𝛿1)] +𝑧2[Et   + ( 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓 ) + 𝑍𝑡−𝑌𝑡 −    (𝛿2)]           (3.2.5a)  
             (𝑧0                   u              y                    b    𝑧1 + 𝑧2 = 1)    
According to our hypothesis, the wage rate is set according to the schemes described earlier and firms determine the 
demand. The demand equations for the two inputs, 𝑁𝑡     𝑍𝑡     determined by firms when price flexibility is 
prevalent: 
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     𝑁𝑡=−([1 − 𝛿2]/ [1 − 𝛿2 − 𝛿1])(𝑊𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
∗)−(*
𝛿2
[1−𝛿2
− 𝛿1+) (( Et   + 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓 )– 𝑃𝑡
∗) + 
[1 − 𝛿2 − 𝛿1]
−1ln[
∈−1
∈
]+
[(1−𝛿2)𝑙 𝑛( 𝛿1)+𝛿2 ln(𝛿2)]
1−𝛿1−𝛿2
                                                     (3.2.5b)  
𝑍𝑡= −(𝛿1/[1 − 𝛿2 − 𝛿1])(𝑊𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
∗) − ( [1 − 𝛿1]/[1 − 𝛿2 − 𝛿1]) (( Et   + 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓 )– 𝑃𝑡
∗) + 
[1 − 𝛿2 − 𝛿1]
−1  [
∈−1
∈
]+ [
𝛿1 ln(𝛿1)+(1−𝛿1)ln(𝛿2)
1−𝛿1−𝛿2
]                     (3.2.5c) 
   
Note that when firms function in imperfectly competitive circumstances in, both, the product and the labor market , the 
level of employment is lower than it would be under perfect competition, an employment outcome that has been 
described by Joan Robinson (1933), the great Cambridge economist, as “ monopolistic exploitation”.  
Substituting next (3.2.5b) and (3.2.5c) into the marginal cost equation, (3.2.5a) and using the (3.2.4 b,c,d) enable us to 
obtain, after extensive re-arrangements and exploiting (3.2.4a), the equation    𝑃𝑡
∗         k                     −
          z   :  
     𝑃𝑡
∗ − ?̅? = 𝛾1(𝑌𝑡 − ?̅?) + 𝛾2(Et − E̅  )+𝛾3( 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) + 𝛾4(𝑃𝑡
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑓̅̅̅̅   )                (3.2.6) 
 w    : 𝛾1  𝛾2 𝛾3  𝛾4      composite parameters , 𝑃𝑡
𝑧𝑓 = foreign currency price of the foreign input and 𝑃𝑡
𝑓 =
                        x; this completes the description of the wage-price sector structure. 
3.3 The International Financial Sector 
In complete financial markets, international investors who are risk-neutral generate, through arbitrage, uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) taking the simple form: 
             𝑟𝑡 =  𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝐸𝑡Et+1− E t                                  (3.3.1)                                            
where 𝑟𝑡
𝑓  𝑖s the rate of interest prevailing abroad, and E is the familiar expectations symbol. 
3.4 The Home Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
We close the model with a contemporaneous linear feedback rule that is a variation of Taylor‟s empirically established 
policy instrument rule and serves our particular purposes ( assumed to be known by the public):  
                                 𝑟𝑡 = ?̅? +  ̅ + 𝛷 ( 𝑃𝑡 − ?̅?) + 𝛷𝑌(𝑌𝑡 − ?̅?)                      (3.4.1) 
where ?̅? is the natural rate of interest, and  ̅ is the steady inflation rate that may be constant or in full equilibrium, 
zero. Woodford (2003, ch.2) calls this rule Wicksellian. 
5. The Entire Model in Final Matrix Form 
Some clarifying remarks are necessary first. All foreign variables, including foreign output (except the demand 
for            u  𝑍𝑡) are chosen not to be modeled explicitly, and assume to follow a white noise pattern as in Guender 
(2011). This assumption has been made with a view to concentrate on the present system that turns out complex enough. 
We denote with a hat all variables relative to their steady state and make more compact relevant notation. Focusing on 
the equations (3.1.1𝛼) and (3.2.2), (3.3.1) (the latter in deviations form), substituting appropriately equations (3.4.1) and 
(3.2.6) in them, and collecting forward expectations on the left-hand side, there obtains the canonical model:  
    𝐶10[ ?̂?𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒 ?̂?𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒 Ê𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒
]′ = 𝐶20[?̂?𝑡   ?̂?𝑡      Ê𝑡]′ + 𝐶30[?̂?𝑡−1     ?̂?𝑡−1     Ê𝑡−1]′             (4.1)  
where 𝐶10 , 𝐶20, 𝐶30   are given in the Appendix A.2. 
We pre-multiply by 𝐶10
−1, to obtain the following canonical (homogenous) form of the model:      
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       [100 010 001]′[?̂?𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒 ?̂?𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒 Ê𝑡+1 𝑡
𝑒
]′ − 𝐶10
−1𝐶20[?̂?𝑡   ?̂?𝑡  Ê𝑡]′ − 𝐶10
−1𝐶30[?̂?𝑡−1 ?̂?𝑡−1 Ê𝑡−1]′ = 0    (4.2)                                       
Let 𝑀𝑡 = [?̂?𝑡   ?̂?𝑡  Ê𝑡]′ , then the homogenous solution is  𝑀𝑡 = ∑  𝑖𝑚0𝜆𝑖
𝑡6
0  where  𝑖 is the i eigen vector and 𝜆𝑖 
the i eigen value obtained, from a 6th-degree polynomial equation having common factor 𝜆2. Factoring it out, we derive 
a 4th-degree polynomial equation; let  𝐴(𝜆)  be the 4th -degree polynomial: 
                 
               𝜆4   + 𝐴3𝜆
3 + 𝐴2𝜆
2 + 𝐴2𝜆
2 + 𝐴0                         (4.3)                                                                                            
LaSalle (1986) provides the conditions by which -if and only if they hold- stability    𝐴(𝜆) exists. The conditions are as 
follows: 
|𝐴2(1 − 𝐴0) + 𝐴0(1 − 𝐴0
2) + 𝐴3(𝐴0𝐴3 − 𝐴3𝐴1)| < 𝐴0𝐴2(1 − 𝐴0) + (1 − 𝐴0
2) + 𝐴1(𝐴0𝐴3 − 𝐴1) 
(𝑏) |𝐴0| < 1,            (𝑐) |𝐴1 + 𝐴3| < 1 + 𝐴2 + 𝐴0 
These conditions, howerver, turn out to consist of overly long and extremely intractable expressions. 
Now, given how our model (4.1) has been stacked, we appeal to the Blanchard-Khan (1980) criterion, as the basis of 
our analysis as in most, if not all, of earlier literature. In our case, three characteristic roots/eigen values must be outside 
the unit circle, because a triplet of forward-looking variables exists (on the left-hand side); the resulting equilibrium is 
of a saddle point nature.  
To gain a more concrete perspective let us ignore for the time being the backward-looking term, in which case our 
system could be simply written : 
                  𝐸𝑡 𝑀𝑡+1 =  𝑀𝑡    (4.4a)      or alternatively:       𝑀𝑡 =  
−1𝐸𝑡 𝑀𝑡+1     (4.4b)   
with 𝑀𝑡 b       3 × 1                 as before and   being 3 × 3 (   −     u   ) matrix. 
If the eigen values of   are outside the unit circle then the eigen values of   −1(being the inverses of the eigen values of 
  ) are inside the unit circle, rendering thus the process described in (4.4b) stable (this applies and vice versa in the sense 
that if 4.4b is unstable then 4.4a is stable). Hence, the way in which a system of forward-looking variables has been 
specifically formulated matters critically for its stability behavior. We use formulation (4.4a) whereas Bullard and Mitra 
(2002) use formulation (4.4b). One may choose either of them provided in each case the stability conditions are 
correctly specified. 
The core of the preceding may be found elsewhere (Farmer, 1999;Woodford,2003) but it is useful to reiterate and clarify 
them prior to proceeding to the examination of the issue through a different approach, namely the algorithmic one, a 
theme which we now discuss.  
5. Results and Discussion     
We begin by stipulating that policy parameters ΦP and ΦY belong to an interval, broadly in line with topical literature 
(e.g. Dittmar and Gavin, 2005; Ambler and Lam, 2015). To derive the four characteristic roots, satisfying the 
Blanchard-Khan theorem, we make use of the following set of calibration values, after inspecting carefully other sets, as 
well: 
𝛷1 = 0 30 𝛷2 = 0 25 𝛾1 = 0 05 𝛾2 = 0 1 𝛼1 = 0 2513 𝛼2 = 0 5 𝛼3 = 0 24   
(𝛷 ∈ (0 2)) (𝛷𝑌 ∈ (0 2)) 
Some of these values have been adopted from Froyen and Guender (2007, p.268); relevant topical literature has, also 
provided useful guidance. The initial value of 𝜃 has been taken from World Bank Statistics, so that i  is broadly 
representative (until recently), of a group of industrial small open economies, similar to Portugal and Austria (both 
Euro-zone members). On the whole, our entire parameterization has been carefully chosen to be sufficiently 
representative of a broader range of countries.  
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a) Of particular and critical significance, is the value of θ that determines the degree of trade openness(1−θ). We set 
initially θ=0.6 in which case 1 − 𝜃 = 0 4   As we shall see, we experiment with two values of this parameter in order 
to        b                                         u   (        w         w   x      w                 A)  A 
clarifying note first: by       u      𝛷1    qu      θρ with ρ=0.5 in the case of Austria (Liu and Sercu, 2009). Another 
auxiliary assumption that has implicitly been made is that the share of imports in foreign consumption is quite low. 
The proposed algorithm is a device specifically developed to perform a grid search using 0.1 as a step in deriving 
       u      𝛷𝑌 and 𝛷      w               y  u     u      x       
The outcome is a map of correspondence between policy coefficients of the Taylor rule and determinacy equilibrium 
outcomes; this map enlightens the question of determinacy, regarding the nature of macroeconomic dynamics in the 
open economy. This approach does not distinguish between determinacy/indeterminacy regions but rather affords a 
locus of equilibrium determinacy points. 
We observe a more equivocal relationship between the policy parameter values than before that has profound 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, it is shown through our approach, that determinacy may exist 
without the satisfaction of Taylor‟s principle that is consonant with the point made in the empirical analysis of the U.S 
economy by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and others. To broaden our perspective, we should mention that in 
contrast to these results, De Fiore and Liu (2005), in the sticky price version of their model (using a contemporaneous 
(active) inflation rule), found that Taylor‟s principle must necessarily hold for determinacy regardless of the degree of 
trade openness.  
Further, our algorithmic device has produced an interesting dissection in the range of findings concerning the properties 
of Taylor‟s rule. More specifically, we find that at the lower end of the range of our findings, 
𝛷 (                    b    y) is lower than 𝛷𝑌(            u  u     b    y)  that is an uncustomary finding, whereas 
at the other (higher) end of the derived range, we obtain the far more typical result where   𝛷   >𝛷𝑌             u       
I          , -and this is equally uncustomary finding-the value of 𝛷𝑌 has been found to be definitely higher than in 
most other determinacy studies, thus turning on their head previous results that generally called for a small response to 
output gaps. For example, Ambler and Lam (2015) in their closed economy set-up, find that the output stability 
coefficient is in the range between zero and one that is representative of earlier literature. A notable exception, is 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko(op. cit.) who favor a robust response to output gaps that makes the generalized Taylor‟s 
principle be satisfied provided that there is zero or low trend inflation. Earlier, Williams (1999) had shown, under 
rational expectations, that a flexible PLT(with a non-negligible output coefficient) converges to the optimal policy rule, 
in the output-inflation variance trade-off frontier, if φ is equal or greater than 0.5 where φ denotes the weight attached to 
output stabilization. His results regarding the optimal rule prove robust to model uncertainty. Moreover, there is 
evidence by Dib et al (1013) according to which they report, from a welfare point of view, a higher output coefficient 
under a PLT rule than the one under IT rule. 
In our open economy, it is possible that a higher 𝛷𝛶    may substitute for a lower Φ  value so that some balance may 
 b                         bu        qu   b  u            y   Priority lies with price stability (only at the upper end 
of the values range), but the novelty is that output gaps should also be far more seriously taken into account than 
previously, at least when PLT and not IT forms part of the rule. This key finding and the rest of the results modify 
drastically our conventional perception of Taylor‟s equation (at least, as regards, case A). These are portrayed in the 
following findings: 
                         (0 < 𝛷 ≤ 1 9]  (0 < 𝛷𝑌 ≤ 1  ]                           (5.1)  
The findings of Ball (1999), favor the upgraded role of output in the sense that there is an improvement (relative to the 
closed economy) in the trade-off variability between output and inflation without, however, addressing the determinacy 
issue, using a different model that emphasizes lagged behavior of the variables involved. Moreover, Froyen and 
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Guender (2007) and Guender (2011) found drastic implications (albeit from a different perspective), depending on the 
presence or not, of an exchange rate channel in the wage-price sector. 
 Motivated by their finding, we repeat our analysis by setting the 𝛾2 parameter equal to zero and examine the 
implications for the determinacy issue, when the exchange rate impacts only the trade sector. The deeper essence of the 
foregoing results does not change much. The whole picture changes only quantitatively; the finding about the 
significance of output gaps is still robust to this change in specification. Intuitively, it is possible that the significance of 
output gaps may reflect actions taken by the authorities, to attenuate exchange rate volatility to avoid a serious impact 
on output volatility.  
b) Because the question of openness lies at the centre of our discussion, examining the implications of a smaller degree 
of trade openness is also critical, by setting θ=0.85 implying a degree of trade openness, 1-θ=0.15, approximately 
one-third of its initial value; this pertains to the case of the United States economy (this is our case B).The value of ρ is 
set, in this case, equal to 0.35 that is well within the range of suggested values (Kilponen et al, 2013); also, in this case, 
the share of imports in foreign consumption is assumed to be high(unlike the previous case). The previous results 
change drastically, acquiring a far more conventional form. In particular, we obtain: 
          (0 < 𝛷 ≤ 1  ]  (0 < 𝛷𝑌 ≤ 0  ]                        (5.2) 
with the majority of values converging approximately 1.5 in the former case, and 0.55 in the latter case, as in traditional 
literature, which mostly pertains to the closed economy setting. In the present case, it always obtains that 𝛷 >
 𝛷𝑌  A                                    in case A, where both goals (price and output stability) are significant, 
implying from a normative point of view, that underrating the significance of output gaps    in this case, clearly not 
warranted. Thus, from determinacy point of view, the difference between case A and B is striking and may be solely 
ascribed to the different degree of trade openness. 
Taylor‟s principle has been a controversial and equivocal issue. If concentrated on the 
pr         b    y coefficient   w   y 𝑠    y  b                                     u   y                A   As noted 
previously, determinacy may exist without the requirement of Taylor‟s principle. Case B is different, in which 𝛷 >
1  typically holds. According to Giannoni (op.cit.), however, the preceding are of no importance for Taylor‟s principle as 
long as 𝛷  and 𝛷𝑌 are positive if the rule has a PLT component as in the present case. 
Overall, the results of our particular model show that determinacy is feasible, contingent on the proper specification of 
Taylor‟s rule. Moreover, the analyses of experiments based on cases A and B, reveal sharp differences depending on the 
degree trade openness; the latter is shown, by example, to be a crucial factor in the design of determinacy-consistent 
Taylor rules. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1                The inter-temporal utility function is given by: 
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 
𝑡𝑈(
∞
𝑡=0
?̃?𝑡)𝑒
𝑣𝑡+𝑖 
 (a tilde denotes a real variable);             u       ;  𝑡      w                          . 
For our purposes, the one -period utility function is given by: 
                                   𝑈[?̃?𝑡] =
[ ̃𝑡
1−1/𝜌
]
1−1/𝜌
𝑒𝑣𝑡= 
 [ ̃𝑡
𝑑  ̃𝑡
𝑓
]1−1/𝜌
1−1/𝜌
𝑒𝑣𝑡   
 The budget constraint is: 
?̃?𝑡+𝑖 +?̃?𝑡+𝑖/𝛱𝑡+𝑖 = (1+𝑅𝑡−1+𝑖) (?̃?𝑡−1+𝑖/?̃?𝑡+𝑖) +labor income, i =0, 1, 2 
Applying the Lagrangian method with respect to ?̃?𝑡     ?̃?𝑡 , we derive:                
                      𝑒𝑣𝑡   [?̃?𝑡
−1/𝜌
 ] =  ?̃?𝑡      (A 1 1)                      ?̃?𝑡  /𝛱𝑡  = 𝐸𝑡β[?̃?𝑡+1/𝛱𝑡+1](1+𝑅𝑡)    (A.1.2) 
                                                  ?̃?𝑡 is the Lagrangian multiplier 
These conditions yield, through combination, equation (3.1.3) in the text, after taking logs. 
A.2 :   𝐶10 𝐶20 𝐶30                      y by: 
       [
1 𝛷1𝜃 + 𝛷2 𝛷1(1 − 𝜃) − 𝛷2
0 𝛼3 0
0 1 1
] [
1 + 𝛷1𝛷𝑌 𝛷1𝛷 + 𝛷1𝜃 + 𝛷2 𝛷1(1 − 𝜃) − 𝛷2
−𝛼2𝛾1 1 −𝛼2𝛾2
𝛷𝑌 𝛷 1
] [
0 0 0
0 −𝛼1 0
0 0 0
] 
A.3: Although the focus of this paper is by far, the issue of determinacy, many studies on monetary policy rules deal 
with the question of optimization which we shall briefly address; let us specify the target volatility function:
 M𝑖 𝐸𝑡 ∑  
𝑡[∞0 (𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃)̅̅ ̅
2 +   (𝑌𝑡 −𝑌)̅̅ ̅
2] 
We consider a stripped down version of the model consisting of equations 3.1.1α, 3.3.1, 3.4.1, describing an economy of 
pure exchange reminiscent of the basic version of De Fiore and Liu (op.cit.). Unlike the closed economy, the optimal 
values of 𝛷  
∗ and 𝛷𝛶 
∗        y     u   w      PL              y b     w            key characteristic feature, 
namely that both         x       y                                                
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